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In his excellent review of the frrst volume of our
two-volume anthology, Interpretation and Explanation
in the Study of Animal Behavior, Kenneth Shapiro
provides a provocative account of the strengths and
weaknesses of cognitive ethology. We would like to take
this opportunity to highlight and extend some of
Shapiro's points, and to explain more fully what we
hope to accomplish in our work on cognitive ethology.
One of our motivations, like Shapiro's, is practical.
Although there is no purely logical connection between
views about mental continuity and views about moral
continuity, we believe that there are important
psychological connections. In our view, a culture which
recognizes its behavioral and emotional kinship with
nonhuman animals is one that is likely to recognize its
moral kinship as well (Bekoff and Jamieson 1991;
Wuensch et al. 1991; Rollin 1989). The moral case for
changing our behavior with respect to nonhuman
animals has been convincingly argued by many
philosophers (see for example Singer 1990, Regan 1983,
and Sapontzis 1987). We see our work in cognitive
ethology in part as contributing to the epistemic
infrastructure that will make such moral views more
widely accepted.
Our motivations are also theoretical. In the post-World
War II period, especially in the United States, philosophy
and biology have increa.<>ingly become estranged. Tomany
biologists philosophy bas seemed irrelevant or even

Singer, P. (1975). Animal Liberation. New York: New York
Review of Books.
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Increasingly in the American academic community
science has come to mean the systematic empirical
pursuit of any statistically significant effect. This notion
of science is too narrow, since understandings of nature
may involve conceptual as well as empirical elements
and may not lend themselves to quantitative represen
tations and tests of statistical significance. This
conception is too broad, since many effects are trivial,
and identifying them does not lead to a deeper
understanding of nature. If science is to continue to
enjoy its current levels of interest and support, this
conception of science which focuses on methodology
must give way to one which emphasizes understanding.
Part of why cognitive ethologists oscillate between
positivism and Cartesianism is because these are both
deeply rooted and attractive ways of thinking about the
mind. Various mid-twentieth century philosophers {for
example, Wittgenstein 1953) have tried to articulate
alternative conceptions of the mind, but they are often
difficult to grasp (even by philosophers) and resist
operationalizing. While we can identify mental states
in ourselves and others, and while mentalistic
explanations often seem to provide understanding, it is
very difficult to say what the mind is in general (much
less what consciousness is). It may be that our best
understandings of sentient and intelligent nature will
lead us away from such concepts. At this point, however,
cognitive ethologists can console themselves with the
knowledge that their discipline is an aspect of the
broader field of cognitive studies and conceptually may
not be in any worse shape than highly regarded, related
fields such as cognitive psychology. We are a long way
from understanding the natural history of the mind, but
in our view this amounts to a scientific challenge rather
than grounds for depression or dismissal. (We thank
Lori Gmen and John A. Fisher for their comments on
an earlier draft)

antagonistic. Other biologists feel that philosophers who
do take biology seriously set themselves up as the True
Guardians of the Scientific Method. To philosophers, on
the other hand, biology, especially the study of animal
behavior, has often seemed mindlessly empirical. Often
what matters are publishable results rather than their
meaning or significance. In our view philosophy and
biology together can help create a science that is
empirically attuned, conceptually rigorous, and socially
responsible. We hope that our anthology, as well as our
recent papers (Bekoff and Jamieson l99la, Bekoff and
Jamieson 1991b, Bekoff and Jamieson 1990), are
contributions towards this goal.
Shapiro rightly points out that despite some
ingenious studies and bold hypotheses, cognitive
ethology is at this time a rather primitive research
program. Cognitivists replace the mechanical metaphors
of the behaviorists with more up-to-date electronic ones,
but in both cases the fact of animal minds seems to
escape the metaphors (Griffin 1984). Part of the
problem, also noted by Shapiro, is that the view of the
mind found in studies of animal behavior often seems
to oscillate between positivism and Cartesianism: either
the mind does not exist, or it cannot be scientifically
studied. All of this leads Shapiro to formulate a dilemma
for cognitive ethology: either it will develop into a
reductive physiological science; or it will become an
anthropology of nonhuman animals, lacking in scientific
standing. We agree that these are real dangers, but we
are not as pessimistic as Shapiro.
We should ftrst appreciate how far we have· come.
Even if the cognitivistmodels are uncomfortably similar
to behaviorist ones in their failure to make room for
subjectivity, still it is a great achievement that we are
moving towards an integrated view ofbehavior. Although
behaviorists gave lip service to the idea that the same
mechanisms are at work in both humans and nouhumans,
as a matter offact their theories provided little explanatory
power with respect to humans. Thus behaviorism
degenerated into the study of (mainly) rats and pigeons,
with only true believers clinging to the hope that one day
common sense psychology might be replaced by a
behaviorist vocabulary (Skinner 1971). Cognitivist
models are still relatively undeveloped, yet it appears that
they have great explanatory power over a broad range of
human and nonhuman behavior (Ristau 1991 ).
As for Shapiro's dilemma, it seems to us that what
is required to break out of it are new conceptions of
both science and the mind.
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I am pleased to see that Bekoff and Jamieson (B&J)
and I are in substantial agreement on many of the
issues raised in volume I of their recent book and in
my review of it. In particular, I agree with them on
the following:

Ristau, C. (ed.). (1991}. Cognitive Ethology. Hillsdale NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Rollin, B. (1989). The Unheeded Cry. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Sapontzis, S. (1987). Morals, Reason, and Animals.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

1. Recognition of moral kinship with nonhuman
animals is likely to follow recognition of
"behavioral and emotional kinship."

Singer, P. (1990). Animal Liberation, second edition. New
York: New York Review of Books.

2. Cognitive ethology can provide an "epistemic
infrastructure" necessary for the philosophical
argument for and the public acceptance of that
kinship. We should add that the emerging subfield
of "animal studies" also can make an important
contribution to that necessary empirical base. This
enterprise, which provides social scientific
studies of the ways in which nonhuman animals
figure in our lives, already has given rise to
academic programs and journals (Anthrowos and
the forthcoming Society and Animals).

Skinner, B. F. (1971). Beyond Freedom and Dignity. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Wuensch, K., G. Poteat, and L. Jernigan (1991 ). "Support for
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3. Cognitivism is responsible for some recent gains
in the re-minding of nonhuman animals, a
necessary move in the recognition of kinship.
And, in particular, I believe B&J agree with me on
the following:
1. Cognitive ethology bas residual problems
notably, an adherence to methodological
behaviorism, which, at times, revisits the
limitations of its predecessor, behaviorism proper,
and an over-reliance on the metaphor of the
computer, which metaphor fails "to make room
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